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In this paper we jointly evaluate the Federal Reserve staff forecasts of U.S. real output growth 
and the inflation rate assuming the forecasts are to be used as inputs for the Taylor rule.  Our 
simple methodology generates “policy forecast errors” which have a direct interpretation for the 
impact of forecast errors on the target interest rate given by the Taylor rule.  Without interest rate 
smoothing, we find that, on average, the Taylor rule target interest rate would have been 
approximately a full percentage point away from the intended target because of errors in 
forecasting output growth and inflation.  Our results are robust to changes in the forecast horizon 
and to changes in the weights on the variables in the policy rule.   
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1. Introduction 
Forecasts are an essential input into all decisions involving the future. The accuracy of 
these forecasts can determine the adequacy, validity, and credibility of both macro and micro 
economic decisions. It is for this reason that the accuracy of these forecasts is evaluated. 
However, there are different perspectives or approaches for conducting these evaluations.  In one 
approach, the forecaster’s accuracy is evaluated while another method considers the value of the 
forecast to its users.  
The traditional approach for evaluating accuracy has been to measure the magnitude of 
the error that is associated with the forecasts of each particular variable.
1 If an individual or 
organization forecasts both the inflation rate and the GDP growth rate for next year, the accuracy 
of the forecast of each variable is calculated separately. This is the approach that has been 
previously used to evaluate the forecasts of the Federal Reserve’s staff (Clements et al., 2007; 
Joutz and Stekler, 2000; Romer and Romer, 2000; Sims, 2002; Stekler, 1994).
 2   
There is, however, a problem that is associated with this traditional forecast evaluation 
approach: the loss function may contain more than one argument.  This paper addresses this 
problem, focusing on the forecasts of the Federal Reserve (Fed). The Fed is concerned with both 
inflation and output growth.  This suggests that the accuracy of both variables should be 
evaluated simultaneously.  Sinclair et al. (2010) provided the procedures for jointly evaluating 
the directional accuracy of the Fed’s forecasts but did not consider how to jointly evaluate the 
quantitative predictions.   
                                                 
1 Usually mean square error is the error metric because it is associated with a quadratic loss function.  
2While most evaluations have focused on the accuracy of a particular variable, there have also been discussions 
about the appropriate procedures for jointly evaluating multiple forecasts (See Hymans, 1968; Clements and Hendry 
and subsequent comments, 1993; Eisenbeis, et al.,  2002;  and Komunjer and Owyang, 2007) or for comparing 
forecasts of different variables (Lahiri and Sheng, 2010). However, these evaluations involving multiple variables 
were not done in the context of policy loss functions or decision rules.   2
If the intended use of the Fed’s forecasts is known, it may be possible to jointly evaluate 
the accuracy of the quantitative growth rate and inflation forecasts.  In the case of monetary 
policy, there has been considerable discussion that some form of the Taylor Rule is a good 
approximation for the decision rule used by the Fed in setting their target interest (i.e. federal 
funds) rate (see, for example, the collection of articles in Taylor, 1999). By assuming that this is 
the decision rule, we can jointly evaluate the GDP and inflation forecasts of the Fed and estimate 
the size of the errors resulting from the use of these forecasts in the Taylor rule. We ask the 
following question: Given this specific policy rule, what would be the impact of forecast errors 
on the implied federal funds rate target?
3   
Our work is in the spirit of evaluating forecasts by considering the economic costs of 
prediction errors (Clements, 2004; Granger and Pesaran, 2000a and 2000b; and Pesaran and 
Skouras, 2002).  It is also related to the work by Orphanides (2001, 2003) on the impact of real-
time data on monetary policy.  Our contribution is to draw these two lines of research together to 
specifically evaluate forecasts in the context for which they are prepared.   
We next present data used in this analysis. We evaluate the Greenbook forecasts that are 
made by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Fed.  These forecasts are produced before 
each meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee and contain projections on the economy up 
to eight quarters into the future. We then present a methodology for evaluating policy forecast 
errors assuming that the Fed follows the Taylor rule. Subsequent sections present the results, 
robustness checks with respect to the specification of the policy rule, and our conclusions. 
                                                 
3 There is much debate in the literature on the Taylor Rule as to the specific form of the rule.  We show in section 6 
that our results are robust to the weights chosen for the variables in the policy rule.  We further show that interest 
rate smoothing will reduce the impact of the current forecast errors.   3
2. Data 
We examine the Greenbook forecasts for each quarter from 1965.4 through 2002.4, but, 
for some analyses, also divide the data into two subperiods, 1965.4-1979.2 and 1979.3-2002.4.
4  
These periods correspond to the pre-Volcker and Volcker-Greenspan eras at the Fed. The 
projections used in this analysis are the annualized growth rate of real output (GNP from 1965 to 
1991 and GDP from 1992 on) and the annualized inflation rate (based on the implicit price 
deflator through the first quarter of 1996, then the chain-weighted price index from 1996.2 on).
5  
We only analyze the current quarter and one quarter ahead projections.   
We focus on short horizons because the Greenbook forecasts have sometimes been based 
on an assumed (possibly varying) path for monetary policy.  At other times, however, the 
forecasts assumed that monetary policy would remain unchanged over its forecast horizon 
(Reifschneider and Tulip, 2007).  Since the assumed path for monetary policy associated with 
each Greenbook forecast is not known, a possible complication arises when analyzing longer-
term forecasts.  The current quarter and one-quarter ahead forecasts are too short of a time 
horizon, however, to be affected by the Fed’s future path for monetary policy.  Therefore, 
regardless of whether the Fed assumes a constant path or a varying path for monetary policy, the 
current and one-quarter-ahead forecasts will be unaffected by those assumptions. 
There are at least two forecasts per quarter, each made in various months of the quarter.  
Consequently the forecasts made for the current and next quarter have leads of zero to five 
months to the end of the relevant quarter.  The horizons of the forecasts vary between zero and 
five months: horizons of (a) zero to two months and (b) three to five months for the current and 
next quarters, respectively.  Because forecasts were not made at all horizons in every quarter, the 
                                                 
4 The Greenbook data are only available with at least a 5-year lag.   
5 We use the compounded annual rate of change to construct the growth rates.   4
number of observations differs between horizons.  The actual values were the data available 
approximately 90 days after the end of the quarter to which they refer.
6   
3. The Fed’s Policy Rule 
"Even if the actual policy process is far more sophisticated than any simple rule 
could completely describe, the [Taylor] rule often provides a reasonably good 
approximation of what policymakers decide and a framework for thinking about 
policy actions." 
--Federal Reserve Board Vice Chairman Donald L. Kohn (2007) 
 
In order to analyze the effects of the Fed’s forecasts errors on its selection of a target 
interest rate, it is necessary to first establish the relevant policy rule. We assume the Fed either 
follows the original Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) or uses it as a guide in setting monetary policy.  
Although Taylor originally proposed his rule as an empirical description of past Fed policy 
actions, Woodford (2001a, 2001b) has shown that the Taylor rule can also be theoretically 
justified as a prescriptive rule. Clarida et al (2000) suggested that it should be forward-looking, 
employing expected future values of both output and inflation.  As pointed out by Orphanides 
(2001), even if the Fed is using current values of both output and inflation, the data the Fed has 
at the time they are setting policy is not the actual values, but predictions of those values.  Rather 
than focusing on the various issues associated with this rule, we start with the fixed weights 
proposed by Taylor (1993).  We show in Section 6 that our results are robust to the range of 
weights considered in the literature.  
                                                 
6 The use of the real time data avoids definitional and classification changes.  Our results are robust to when the data 
published 45-60 days after the end of the quarter are used.  Our real-time data were obtained from the ArchivaL 
Federal Reserve Economic Data (ALFRED®), maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis at 
http://alfred.stlouisfed.org/.    5
According to the forward-looking Taylor rule, the Fed sets a target federal funds rate,
Tf
t i , 
based on equation (1), where, the superscript “f” denotes that the target is based on forecasted 
variables.
7 The Fed’s policy decision  ) ( ,
f
h t t P +  is written as: 










h t t − + − + + = = + + + + π π π , (1) 
where r* is the equilibrium real interest rate, π* is the Fed’s implicit inflation rate target, and Y* 
is potential output.  While the output gap (i.e. lnY – lnY*) is typically used in the Taylor rule, the 
growth rate of real GDP is typically used in forecast evaluation.  For our application we replace 
the output gap by the GDP growth rates, yielding the following policy rule: 










h t t − + − + + = = + + + + π π π , (1′) 
where y* is the potential output growth rate.
8  The Fed forecasts both inflation, 
f
h t+ π , and output 
growth, 
f
h t y + , h periods ahead.   
The actual outcomes, however, will in general differ from the Fed’s forecasts.  If the 
actual values for  h t+ π  and  h t y + were instead included in the Taylor rule (i.e. if the Fed had 
perfect forecasts or perfect foresight), a potentially different target federal funds rate would have 
been suggested by the policy rule.  Consequently, under perfect foresight the implied interest rate 
target would have been:  








t h t t − + π − π + π + = = + + + + , (2) 
                                                 
7 Following Orphanides (2001), we assume that the Fed uses the Greenbook forecasts in their decision rule.   
8 If we assume that potential output, Y*, is either known or a constant, then we can difference out potential output 
which permits us to use the growth rate in order to construct the policy rule.  A similar approach has been used by 
Hamilton et al. (2009). For a discussion of the role of real time output gap estimates and the Taylor rule, see 
Orphanides (2001).     6
where 
A
h t+ π  and 
A
h t y + represent the actual realizations of  h t+ π  and  h t y + .  The difference between 
i
Tf and i
T measures the difference in the Fed funds rate suggested by the Taylor rule that occurs 
because of inaccurate forecasts and thus represents the implied policy forecast error, PFEt: 












t t y y i i PFE + + + + − + − = − = 5 . 0 5 . 1 π π . (3) 








h t y y + + − , are the Fed’s forecast errors for the inflation rate 
and real output growth respectively.  Given the PFEs, the evaluation procedures are then similar 
to those used in judging individual forecast errors. 
9   
4. Evaluation Procedure: Standards of Comparison 
There are two sets of forecasts that we use as standards of comparison: the PFEs that 
would have occurred if (1) naïve forecasts or (2) the median forecasts from the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters
10 had been used to set policy.  In each case, the comparison uses the 
same weights and has the same number of observations as were used in constructing the PFEs of 
the Fed forecasts that we are evaluating.  We calculate the mean absolute policy forecast error 
(MAPFE) and root mean squared policy forecast error (RMSPFE) for the full sample as well as 
for a sub-sample where we have the median forecasts from the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF) available for comparison. 
The naïve forecast assumes that the same growth rate of output and the same inflation 
rate as were observed in the previous quarter will occur in the future period(s).
11  We also use the 
                                                 
9 For a discussion of the impact of using projections on the estimates of the Taylor rule, see Orphanides and Wieland 
(2008).  We do not use the interest rate, the equilibrium real interest rate, the Fed’s implicit inflation rate target, or 
potential output in our analysis.  Considerable research has gone into estimating these variables (e.g. Clark and 
Kozicki, 2005, for the equilibrium real interest rate and Leigh, 2008, for the Fed’s implicit inflation rate target).  
While these variables may be time-varying, we treat them here as known to the policymaker and they thus drop out 
of our expression.  This assumption allows us to isolate the impact of forecast errors.   
10 These data come from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (for a description of this survey, see Croushore, 
1993).   
11 We construct these naïve “forecasts” from the real-time data, published in the Greenbook, of GDP growth and the 
inflation rate for the quarter before the Greenbook forecasts were made.  This assures that the same information as   7
median forecasts from the SPF to construct forecasts comparable to our Greenbook data.  Since 
the SPF forecasts are only reported once per quarter (in the middle of the second month of each 
quarter), they are comparable to the Fed forecasts made with one and four month horizons. The 
SPF forecasts are available beginning with the fourth quarter of 1968.  
5. Results 
For the entire sample 1965:4-2002:4, the mean absolute policy forecast error (MAPFE) 
based on Fed forecasts at the zero month horizon is 101 basis points (Table 1).  This can be 
interpreted as the amount by which the implied target interest rate based on the Taylor rule 
would have differed by using forecasts rather than the actual data in the policy rule.
12 According 
to this analysis, the implied target interest rate based on the Taylor rule was at least a full 
percentage point off because of errors in forecasting growth and inflation at the zero horizon.
13  
We also tested for bias, but the null of no bias was usually not rejected.   
Table 1 also presents the root mean squared policy forecast errors (RMSPFE) for the 
samples and horizons we analyze in our subsequent tests.  As expected, both the MAPFE and 
RMSPFE in general increase with the length of the forecast horizon and the MAPFE and 
RMSPFE are both smaller than those of the naïve and SPF forecasts in all cases.  This result is 
consistent with previous findings from evaluations of a single variable.   
A comparison of the results for the Pre-Volcker sample (Panel B) and the Volcker-
Greenspan sample (Panel C) suggests that there has been a small reduction of both MAPFE and 
                                                                                                                                                             
was available to the Fed forecasters at the time the predictions were made was used in constructing this alternative 
forecast.   
12 Bernanke (2010) pointed out that using forecasts in the Taylor rule instead of actual values may explain the 
difference in the interpretation of the stance of monetary policy from 2002 to 2006.  Based on forecasts it appears 
that the Fed was close to the recommended policy in the Taylor rule. Therefore the intended policy of the Fed was to 
approximately follow the Taylor rule.  If, as Taylor (2007) points out, however, we use the actual values for output 
and inflation in the Taylor rule, it appears that monetary policy was much looser than prescribed by the Taylor rule.   
13 This result holds even if we look at the 4-quarter average of the forecasts instead of just the current quarter.  The 
volatility of the forecast errors is reduced with the 4-quarter average, but the size of the errors increases and offsets 
the volatility reduction.     8
RMSPFE in the more recent period.  The similarity of these results with the full sample results, 
however, suggests that our findings for the full-sample are not dependent upon a specific time 
period.
14  Furthermore, the improvement is also present for the naïve forecasts, which suggests 
no relative improvement on the part of the Fed. 
6. Alternative Specifications  
In our analysis we have chosen to focus on the policy rule as initially formulated in 
Taylor (1993). Subsequently, a number of authors have estimated the policy rule that was 
actually used by the Fed (e.g. Clarida et al, 2000; Orphanides, 2001).  Two key issues are the 
size of the policy rule weights and the role of interest rate smoothing.
15   
6A. Alternative Policy Rule Weights  
One focus of this literature, and the part relevant to our analysis, is the weights associated 
with inflation and output in the Taylor rule.  We performed a simple calculation to examine the 
effect on the PFE of using weights other than those of the original Taylor Rule. The PFE is a 
weighted sum of the individual forecast errors, consequently we ask: Given the individual 
forecast errors, what weights would minimize the impact of the forecast errors on the implied 
target interest rate?  We thus determined the weights that minimize the RMSPFE of the Fed’s 
forecasts, assuming that the weights summed to two.
16  We calculated different weights for each 
horizon and allowed for both the case where the weights are constant for the full sample and 
allowing the weights to differ between the pre-Volcker and Volcker-Greenspan periods.  In all 
                                                 
14 These subsamples are representative of several alternative subsamples that we explored. 
15 Another concern, beyond the scope of this paper, is that the optimal Taylor rule may not be linear (Nobay and 
Peel, 2003).  There has been a substantial amount of research in evaluating forecasts in the case of nonlinear loss 
functions (e.g. Elliott et al., 2005 and 2008; Patton and Timmermann, 20071), including evidence that the Fed’s loss 
function may not be linear, with respect to inflation (Capistran, 2008) and with respect to output growth (Patton and 
Timermann, 2007b) when the forecasts are evaluated separately. 
16 Almost identical results were found when we instead minimized the MAPFE.  The restriction that the coefficients 
sum to two is consistent with the literature where every estimate or prescriptive rule we found suggests the 
coefficients sum to something greater than or equal to two.  We chose the lower bound so that we are truly 
minimizing the RMSPFE.     9
cases the weights are very similar to the Taylor weights.  These weights do not necessarily imply 
anything about actual Fed behavior, but they allow us to set a lower bound on the impact of 
forecast errors on the implied target interest rate.
17 The results are very similar to what we found 
using the Taylor weights.  Based on this analysis we still conclude that, without smoothing, the 
impact of forecast errors alone on the implied target interest rate based on the Taylor rule is 
approximately 100 basis points. 
6B. Interest Rate Smoothing 
According to Giannoni and Woodford (2002), the application of certainty equivalence 
requires interest rate smoothing.  Therefore, suppose the policy rule is modified to allow for 
interest rate smoothing.  The policy forecast error in this case would be a simple proportion of 
the policy forecast error without smoothing: 












t t y y i i PFE + + + + − + − − = − = 5 . 0 5 . 1 1 π π ρ , (3′) 
Estimates of the smoothing parameter, ρ, have varied widely in the literature (e.g. Clarida et al, 
1998, find ρ = 0.8, whereas Rudebusch, 2001, argues that the smoothing parameter may be 
negligible in practice).  For example, if the smoothing parameter is 0.5, then the impact of the 
forecast errors on the policy decision is reduced by half.  Thus, the larger the forecast errors are 
expected to be, the greater the benefit of smoothing.
18   
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we developed a simple methodology in order to evaluate the impact of 
forecast errors on the Fed’s monetary policy as characterized by a policy rule that is assumed to 
take the form of a Taylor rule.  We find that the Fed’s policy forecast error is smaller than the 
                                                 
17 In particular, the specific weights found by Clarida et al (2000) were in the set of potential weights we considered.  
Their weights resulted in a higher MAPFE than those that minimized the MAPFE.  The weights, RMSPFEs, and 
MAPFEs are all available from the authors upon request.   
18 This assumes, however, that the past interest rate was set in an appropriate way.  As noted by Orphanides and 
Williams (2007), interest rate smoothing can also cause past errors to persist.     10
errors that would have resulted from naïve forecasts or SPF predictions.  Nevertheless, the mean 
absolute policy forecast error of the Fed forecasts is approximately 100 basis points. The results 
for selected subsamples were similar to those for the entire period and a simple calculation 
showed that the weights placed on the two variables that minimize the PFE were similar to those 
contained in the original Taylor Rule.  Thus we find the robust result that, without interest-rate 
smoothing, forecast errors contribute a mean absolute error of approximately 100 basis points to 
target interest rates set by using a Taylor Rule. 
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Table 1:  Mean Absolute Policy Forecast Error (MAPFE) and  
Root Mean Squared Policy Forecast Error (RMSPFE) 
 




(months)  MAPFEFed MAPFEnaïve   MAPFESPF RMSPFEFed RMSPFEnaïve   RMSPFESPF N 
0  1.01 1.95 ---  1.31  2.77  ---  159 
1  1.25 2.08  1.54 1.67  2.83 1.99  110
20 
2  1.54 1.99 ---  1.93  2.68  ---  94 
3  1.56 2.31 ---  2.08  3.03  ---  159 
4  1.83 2.41  2.21 2.34  3.15 2.77  105
21 
5  1.80 2.38 ---  2.43  3.13  ---  88 
 




(months)  MAPFEFed MAPFEnaïve   MAPFESPF RMSPFEFed RMSPFEnaïve   RMSPFESPF N 
0  1.03 2.06 ---  1.35  2.98  ---  68 
1  1.38 2.26  1.95 1.73  3.18 2.36  54
22 
2  1.71 2.21 ---  2.15  2.97  ---  51 
3  1.84 2.70 ---  2.38  3.46  ---  67 
4  2.09 2.74  2.78 2.69  3.56 3.36  48
23 
5  2.38 2.81 ---  3.01  3.58  ---  44 
 
Panel C:  Volcker-Greenspan Sample (1979.3 – 2002.4) 
 
Horizon 
(months)  MAPFEFed MAPFEnaïve   MAPFESPF RMSPFEFed RMSPFEnaïve   RMSPFESPF N 
0  1.00 1.87 ---  1.29  2.60  ---  91 
1  1.12 1.92  1.23 1.62  2.45 1.66  56 
2  1.35 1.73 ---  1.65  2.29  ---  43 
3  1.36 2.02 ---  1.82  2.67  ---  92 
4  1.61 2.14  1.81 2.01  2.75 2.26  57 
5  1.23 1.96 ---  1.65  2.61  ---  44 
 
                                                 
19 SPF sample starts with forecasts made in 1968.4. 
20 N = 98 for SPF. 
21 N = 97 for SPF. 
22 N = 42 for SPF. 
23 N = 40 for SPF. 